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Abstract 
The effect of generous welfare benefits on unemployment is highly contested. The 
dominant perspective contends that benefits provide disincentive to work, whereas others 
portray benefits as job-search subsidies that facilitate better job matches. Despite many 
studies of welfare benefits and unemployment, the literature has neglected how this 
relationship might vary across institutional contexts. This article investigates how 
unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits affect unemployment across levels 
of the institutional insider/outsider divide. I analyze the moderating role of the disparity in 
employment protection for holders of permanent and temporary contracts and of the 
configuration of wage bargaining. The analysis combines data from 20 European countries 
and the United States using the European Union Labour Force Survey and the Current 
Population Survey 1992–2009. I use a pseudo-panel approach, including fixed effects for 
sociodemographic groups within countries and interactions between benefits and 
institutions. The results indicate that unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits 
successfully subsidize job search and reduce unemployment in labor markets with a 
moderate institutional insider/outsider divide. However, when there is greater disparity in 
employment protection and when bargaining either combines low unionization with high 
centralization or high unionization with low centralization, generous benefits create a 
disincentive to work, plausibly because attractive job opportunities are scarce. 
 
Keywords 
unemployment, welfare state, labor market institutions, institutional interactions, 
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In 2008, U.S. policymakers extended the maximum duration of unemployment benefits 
from a 26-week limit to 73 weeks (with some variation across states) to ameliorate the 
effects of the dramatic increase in unemployment during the economic crisis. This more 
generous approach to benefits was short-lived, however, as the temporary Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation program expired at the end of 2013. The basic argument for 
not further extending benefits was, as U.S. Senator Jon Kyl put it in 2010, that generous 
unemployment insurance “doesn’t create new jobs. In fact, if anything, continuing to pay 
people unemployment compensation is a disincentive for them to seek new work” (156 
Congressional Record:845). Regarding Senator Kyl’s point, Card and colleagues (2015) 
argued that although the duration of unemployment spells generally increases with benefit 
levels, this relationship was particularly strong during the crisis. Indeed, many scholars 
argue that generous and long-running welfare benefits act as a disincentive to work and thus 
increase unemployment (e.g., Lalive 2007; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 2005; Meyer 
1990; Nickell 1997; for a recent overview see Schmieder and von Waechter 2016). The 
notion of a disincentive effect has found its way into influential policy recommendations 
(OECD 1994, 2006) and has been used to justify welfare state retrenchment in a number of 
countries in recent decades (Blyth 2002). 
 
The disincentive perspective is highly contested. Other researchers have presented 
fundamentally different arguments about the effect of welfare benefits on unemployment. 
Howell and Azizoglu (2011), for instance, argue that if benefit generosity increased U.S. 
unemployment during the crisis, it did so by keeping workers closely attached to the labor 
market rather than by encouraging them to drop out of the labor force. The most prominent 
theoretical argument is that instead of functioning as work disincentives, benefits 
financially subsidize the job-search process (Gangl 2004, 2006; Pollmann-Schult and 
Büchel 2005). According to this perspective, welfare benefits for the unemployed relieve 
the pressure to take on bad jobs and enable further education and training (Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012). Eventually, this leads to better 
job matches and fewer job separations, which lowers unemployment in the long run (Nelson 
and Stephens 2012). 
 
The disincentive and job-search-subsidy perspectives differ greatly in their understanding of 
the functions of welfare benefits for jobseekers. Both views have been tested in a multitude 
of case studies and macro comparative analyses. Some of this work offers empirical support 
for the disincentive argument (e.g., Card et al. 2015; Lalive 2007; Meyer 1990; Nickell 
1997); other work supports the job-search-subsidy argument (e.g., Gangl 2004, 2006; 
Nelson and Stephens 2012). Moreover, critical assessments of the literature have 
convincingly called into question the existing results, particularly in regard to how micro-
level mechanisms play out at the aggregate level (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; 
Avdagic and Salardi 2013; Baccaro and Rei 2007; Baker et al. 2005; Howell and Rehm 
2009; Sjöberg 2000). Ultimately, the literature offers quite mixed empirical evidence on the 
relationship between generous welfare benefits and unemployment levels. 
 
This article proposes that the effect of benefits on unemployment differs by institutional 
context. The argument rests on the assumption that benefits are part of the interplay of 
institutions in a complex system (see Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). 
Drawing on recent research on the growing disparities between labor market insiders 
(individuals with permanent employment) and outsiders (the unemployed and individuals 
with temporary employment) (Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Biegert 2014; Emmenegger et al. 
2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; Schwander and Häusermann 2013), I highlight the 
interaction of welfare benefits with the institutional divide between labor market insiders 
and outsiders. I argue that the institutional insider/outsider divide is determined by the 
disparity between employment protection legislation (EPL) for individuals on permanent 
contracts and temporary contracts and by the configuration of unionization and 
centralization in the wage bargaining process. By inadvertently influencing the availability 
of quality jobs for jobseekers, the degree to which institutions create a division between 
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labor market insiders and outsiders moderates how generous welfare benefits affect 
unemployment. 
 
The article makes three unique contributions to the literature. First, by focusing on the 
interaction with the institutional insider/outsider divide, it develops theoretical explanations 
of the relationship between welfare benefits and labor market outcomes. To test these 
propositions empirically, I combine institutional indicators with data on individual 
unemployment from 20 European countries in the European Union Labour Force Survey 
(EULFS) and the United States Current Population Survey (CPS; Flood et al. 2015) for 
1992–2009. I transform the cross-sectional time series data into pseudo-panels at the level 
of sociodemographic groups (Deaton 1985; Verbeek and Vella 2005). Applying the pseudo-
panel technique enables the use of fixed effects. It thus helps rule out bias due to stable 
differences between sociodemographic groups and country-specific factors. As a second 
contribution, the analysis illustrates an underutilized method that provides comparative 
researchers with a novel approach to cross-sectional time series data (for other recent 
applications, see Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Jæger 2013; Neugebauer 2015). Finally, the 
article extends the scope of previous studies by analyzing both unemployment benefits and 
minimum income benefits. Most existing research focuses on unemployment benefits as the 
sole welfare benefit for the unemployed. This neglects the fact that many jobseekers are not 
eligible to receive unemployment insurance (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Howell and 
Rehm 2009). Minimum income benefits include social assistance, housing benefits, child 
support, and other benefits the state provides to needy people when benefit systems, such as 
unemployment insurance, fail (Nelson 2010). By analyzing the relationship between 
unemployment and both unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits, the present 
analysis thus delivers more robust evidence for the relationship between welfare benefits for 
the unemployed and unemployment levels. 
 
WELFARE BENEFITS AS A WORK DISINCENTIVE 
 
A large body of research argues that generous benefits for jobseekers create a disincentive 
to work, which raises unemployment levels (e.g., Card et al. 2015, Lalive 2007; Layard et 
al. 2005; Meyer 1990; Nickell 1997). The disincentive perspective is based on the 
theoretical argument that individuals’ reservation wages increase when high living 
standards can be achieved without having to work. Given that the reservation wage marks 
the line below which individuals will reject job offers, higher benefits will result in a larger 
number of jobs not being taken. Therefore, the basic expectation is that countries with more 
generous welfare benefits will have higher unemployment. 
 
Many quantitative studies have tested the disincentive perspective. Micro-level studies 
usually look at policy shifts and explore whether they lead to changes in the duration of 
individual unemployment spells (e.g., Card et al. 2015; Lalive 2007; van Ours and 
Vodopivec 2006). Meyer (1990), for instance, showed that higher benefits lead to fewer 
exits from unemployment in the United States. Strengthening the case for the disincentive 
perspective, he found that exits from unemployment become more frequent just when 
benefits were about to expire. More recently, Card and colleagues (2015) used data from 
Missouri and a regression kink design to show that the increase in the unemployment 
duration due to benefits is markedly larger in adverse macro-economic conditions. 
 
To test whether the micro-level mechanism plays out on the aggregate level, macro-
comparative studies use the variation of unemployment benefits across countries and years 
to investigate the relationship with unemployment rates. In a prominent study, Nickell 
(1997) regressed unemployment rates on macro indicators of institutional arrangements. He 
found a positive association between generous benefits and unemployment in OECD 
countries. In comparison to findings regarding other labor market institutions, such as EPL, 
unionization, and wage bargaining centralization, the detrimental effect of unemployment 
benefits is one of the more consistent results in this literature (e.g., Layard et al. 2005; 
OECD 2006). 
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At first sight, there seems to be empirical support for the disincentive perspective. However, 
several critical summaries of the literature argue that the existing evidence is far less 
compelling than is widely believed (see Atkinson and Micklewright 1991; Avdagic and 
Salardi 2013; Baccaro and Rei 2007; Baker et al. 2005; Howell and Rehm 2009; Sjöberg 
2000). Although the evidence from micro-level studies is fairly robust, Howell and Rehm 
(2009) point out that the magnitude of the effects found in these studies is typically quite 
modest (see also Atkinson and Micklewright 1991). Single-country case studies, moreover, 
cannot account for the labor market and macro-economic context, which raises the question 
of confounding macro factors and generalizability. Regarding macro-comparative studies, 
Howell and Rehm (2009) problematize the comparability of the reported unemployment 
rates used in these studies because national definitions of unemployment differ. 
Furthermore, they criticize the use of gross replacement rates as an indicator for 
unemployment benefit generosity (i.e., the percentage of previous earnings an average 
production worker receives from insurance before taxes and social security contributions). 
Studies using net replacement rates (i.e., the insurance payments net of taxes and social 
insurance contribution) have found only a weak correlation between unemployment benefits 
and unemployment rates (Howell and Rehm 2009; Sjöberg 2000). These limitations are 
increasingly recognized in the literature on the disincentive perspective (for an overview, 
see Schmieder and von Waechter 2016), but most of the discussion is limited to the size of 
the disincentive effect. In summary, the empirical support for the disincentive argument is 
mixed, particularly in regard to aggregate unemployment. Additional mechanisms such as 
job-search-subsidy effects could explain why micro-level disincentives do not necessarily 
translate into aggregate unemployment. 
 
WELFARE BENEFITS AS A JOB-SEARCH SUBSIDY 
 
In contrast to the disincentive perspective, scholars have argued that generous benefits 
could reduce unemployment by serving as a job-search subsidy (Gangl 2004, 2006; Nelson 
and Stephens 2012). The basis for this argument is that employment and unemployment are 
the result of a matching process conducted by jobseekers and employers (see Sørensen and 
Kalleberg 1981). In contrast to the orthodox economic perspective, the job match 
perspective highlights that unemployment is not primarily caused by poor labor supply. 
Rather, it is the result of the interaction between labor supply and labor demand. In this 
framework, generous benefits can promote employment through two mechanisms. First, 
benefits allow jobseekers to be more selective about job offers by providing a buffer in 
times of joblessness. This increases the quality of the ultimate match between jobseeker and 
job, which in turn decreases separations and thus boosts employment levels (Gangl 2004, 
2006; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel 2005). Second, generous benefits allow workers to 
invest in specific skills, because they provide insurance at times when these workers are 
seeking jobs. The result is a workforce with generally higher and more specific skills, again 
creating higher quality matches for job vacancies (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). Hence, 
proponents of the job-search-subsidy perspective do not question the potentially longer 
duration of individual unemployment spells in a context of high benefits. However, they 
reason that generous benefits will lead to lower unemployment in the long run and on the 
aggregate level because of better job matches and the improved employability of jobseekers 
(see also Morel et al. 2012; Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015). 
 
These arguments have been tested in micro-level designs and macro-comparative research, 
although not as extensively as the disincentive argument. On the micro level, studies have 
focused on the quality of job matches after unemployment spells and how they vary across 
different benefit environments. Pollmann-Schult and Büchel (2005), for instance, showed 
that in Germany, not receiving unemployment benefits is associated with shorter search 
periods but also with over-education in the next job. Comparing Germany and the United 
States, Gangl (2004) found that generous unemployment benefits lead to less dramatic 
losses in post-unemployment income. This finding was confirmed in a wider comparison 
involving the United States and 12 European countries (Gangl 2006). Nelson and Stephens 
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(2012) investigated the employment effects of social investment policies, such as generous 
initial unemployment benefits,1 active labor market policies (ALMP), and childcare 
provision. They conducted an analysis similar to the macro-level studies on the disincentive 
perspective and found that unemployment benefits are positively associated with 
employment levels and job quality. 
 
Beyond the methodological questions discussed in the previous section, both literatures 
have unfortunately neglected two issues. First, neither account has investigated institutional 
interactions. The literature on national production systems argues strongly for the existence 
of interdependencies in the institutional settings of economies (see Amable 2003; Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). The function of an institution such as welfare benefits likely 
depends on the institutional context. Institutional interactions have started to play a more 
prominent role in quantitative labor market research (e.g., Bassanini and Duval 2009; Belot 
and van Ours 2004; Gangl 2006; see also Schmieder and von Waechter 2016). However, to 
the best of my knowledge, no studies on unemployment have explicitly focused on the 
interaction between benefits and their labor market context. 
 
Second, both literatures focus overwhelmingly on unemployment benefits. In most 
countries, social rights to unemployment benefits have to be earned through previous 
employment. As a consequence, only a particular segment of the unemployed can receive 
benefits through unemployment insurance. This selectivity might result in biased outcomes 
because the dependent variable in macro studies is usually the aggregate unemployment 
rate, which includes many who are not eligible for unemployment benefits. Minimum 
income benefits—that is, means-tested publicly provided benefits—have rarely been 
considered in studies on benefit effects. Theoretically, they should operate via the same 
mechanisms as unemployment benefits—either by acting as work disincentives or by 
subsidizing job search. Because minimum income benefits are more widely available to the 
unemployed population, they need to be included in studies of social security regimes for 
unemployed individuals (Pfeifer 2012). 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL INSIDER/OUTSIDER DIVIDE AND WELFARE BENEFIT 
EFFECTS ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
The argument in this section rests on the assumption that welfare benefits are part of a 
complex institutional system (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005): 
“institutions matter and . . . institutions interact” (Belot and van Ours 2004:640). Hence, the 
relationship between benefits and unemployment plausibly depends on the distribution of 
job opportunities for jobseekers. Job-search subsidies will likely be more successful when 
there is a larger pool of quality job opportunities. Conversely, generous benefits should act 
as a stronger disincentive to jobseekers in contexts with fewer good job opportunities. 
Recent research that describes a growing gap between labor market insiders and outsiders 
indicates that the institutional configuration of the labor market affects the distribution of 
job opportunities.  
 
Institutions and the Divide between Insiders and Outsiders 
 
With the growing attention to rising economic inequality in rich democracies, there has 
been a renewed interest in the notion of labor market insiders and outsiders. Building from 
classic theories of insiders and outsiders and dual or segmented labor markets (see 
Doeringer and Piore 1971; Kalleberg, Wallace, and Althauser 1981; Lindbeck and Snower 
1988), European scholars have described a process of labor market dualization between 
individuals with permanent employment (insiders) and those without it (outsiders), that is, 
the unemployed and individuals in temporary jobs, who have a higher propensity of 
becoming unemployed (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2005, 
2014).2 This recent literature rests on the assumption that insiders are in a powerful 
bargaining position because the replacement of workers has transaction costs for employers. 
Therefore, insiders can achieve their goals in a variety of ways, be it through cross-class 
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coalitions with employers, union representation, or social democratic parties (see Davidsson 
and Emmenegger 2013; Goldthorpe 1984; Rueda 2005). This, the dualization literature 
argues, disadvantages outsiders. 
 
Although insiders have an advantageous bargaining position in every economy, the 
dualization literature argues that the gap between insiders and outsiders can be widened by 
labor market institutions. The setup of institutions such as EPL and the wage bargaining 
process determine the positional advantage of individuals in jobs at the core of the labor 
market (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; Thelen 2014). Traditionally, the 
literature has emphasized the benefits of regulation and coordination, for instance, in regard 
to wage inequality (e.g., Brady, Baker, and Finnigan 2013; Jacobs and Myers 2014). By 
contrast, the dualization literature points to configurations in which regulating institutions 
have unintended effects on inequality (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; 
Rueda 2005, 2014). Thelen (2014) cautions researchers not to conflate coordinated 
capitalism with egalitarian capitalism. The unintended consequence of institutionalized 
advantages for labor market insiders is that it increases the barriers that jobseekers have to 
overcome to become insiders (Biegert 2014; Fervers and Schwander 2015). Unlike 
orthodox economics, however, the dualization literature does not claim that regulating 
institutions has effects on overall unemployment. Instead, it argues that the institutionalized 
advantages enjoyed by insiders may affect the distribution of jobs. 
 
The Institutional Insider/Outsider Divide, Welfare Benefits, and Unemployment 
 
The divide between labor market insiders and outsiders is relevant to the study of how 
benefits affect unemployment for two reasons. First, it is the unemployed, and thus 
outsiders, who receive unemployment benefits or minimum income benefits. Second, the 
insider/outsider divide affects the availability of higher quality jobs. In a context of a strong 
insider/outsider divide, employed insiders remain in their positions and employers are more 
selective, which leads to fewer and worse job offers for outsiders. Here, generous benefits 
create a disincentive to job search because quality job offers are scarce, whereas low 
benefits may force jobseekers to take on jobs they would otherwise decline. By contrast, a 
labor market with a moderate insider/outsider divide will yield better job opportunities for 
jobseekers. In this instance, generous benefits might lower unemployment because 
improved job-search and job-matching processes can help jobseekers avoid bad jobs. 
 
Two sets of labor market institutions are most likely to determine the insider/outsider 
divide: (1) EPL for permanent and temporary contracts, and (2) the configuration of the 
wage bargaining process in terms of unionization and centralization (see Emmenegger et al. 
2012; Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2005; Thelen 2014). First, EPL determines how 
difficult it is to hire and fire employees, which reduces the flow in and out of the labor 
market. EPL thus stabilizes the positions of insiders (Barbieri 2009; Gangl 2003; Gebel and 
Giesecke 2011). If letting people go in economic downturns is impeded by strict EPL, 
employers are less likely to offer insider positions to jobseekers. This may be exacerbated if 
employers can easily offer temporary instead of permanent contracts (Eichhorst and Marx 
2011; Palier and Thelen 2010). If temporary contracts are less protected than permanent 
contracts, employers are more likely to offer temporary jobs to jobseekers, and less likely to 
convert temporary jobs into permanent positions. This increases the number of job 
separations and reduces the number of attractive job opportunities (Barbieri and Cutuli 
2016; Bentolila et al. 2012; Gebel and Giesecke 2016; Noelke 2016). The disparity between 
EPL for permanent contracts and temporary contracts will thus increase the insider/outsider 
divide and reduce job opportunities for jobseekers. 
 
Second, unionization and centralization may shape the wage bargaining process to the 
detriment of outsiders. Higher levels of unionization increase unions’ bargaining power, 
which results in less wage inequality, better working conditions, and stronger wage growth 
for the employed (Brady et al. 2013; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Rueda and Pontusson 
2000; Western and Rosenfeld 2011). But because their membership consists primarily of 
7 
 
permanent workers, unions are often thought to represent insider interests (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1988). In addition, increasing wages and secure positions for the employed might 
make employers reluctant to hire. If so, jobseekers will be more likely to receive offers for 
atypical jobs, if any. In addition to unionization, wage bargaining centralization is important 
in the bargaining process (Palier and Thelen 2010; Rueda 2005). Centralization refers to the 
level at which bargaining takes place and the degree to which unions are able to coordinate 
their goals. Centralized bargaining might help unions achieve better outcomes for their 
members, which, in line with the previous argument, could come at the detriment of 
outsiders. Unionization and centralization could thus increase the insider/outsider divide, 
which would negatively affect job opportunities for jobseekers. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (regulation): The effect of increasing unemployment benefits and minimum 
income benefits on unemployment varies with the disparity in EPL for permanent and 
temporary contracts, unionization, and wage bargaining centralization. Benefits increase 
unemployment in contexts with a larger EPL disparity, higher unionization, and higher 
centralization. Benefits reduce unemployment in contexts with a smaller EPL disparity, lower 
unionization, and lower centralization. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is called the regulation hypothesis because it posits that the insider/outsider 
divide is determined on a single dimension between a flexible and a regulated labor market. 
Yet, there is reason to doubt that labor market institutions have a uniform impact on the 
insider/outsider divide. When describing institutional regimes and their dualization 
tendencies, researchers have found large insider/outsider divides in Continental European 
and Mediterranean countries. Liberal and Nordic countries show lower levels of dualization 
(Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Thelen 2014). The assumption that higher levels of 
regulation necessarily lead to a greater insider/outsider divide is thus at odds with the high 
levels of unionization and wage bargaining centralization in Nordic countries. Hence, the 
complementarity of institutional arrangements is essential. When centralized wage 
bargaining is in place, strong unions have an incentive to pursue moderate wage growth that 
benefits the whole economy, because detrimental outcomes cannot be externalized 
(Calmfors and Driffill 1988). Thus, strong unions cooperate with employers and the 
government to achieve a beneficial bargaining outcome (Thelen 2014; Wright 2000). This 
results in moderate wage increases and better job opportunities for jobseekers (Hicks and 
Kenworthy 1998; Streeck 1992; Western 1998).3 By contrast, some Continental European 
countries, such as Germany, are less unionized. In such cases, unions seek bargaining 
outcomes tailored to their specific clientele (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Palier and Thelen 
2010).4 They pursue maximum wage increases, which are less considerate of the greater 
economy but still have widespread influence because of relatively high levels of 
centralization and coverage. The outcome is beneficial for insiders but leaves outsiders with 
lower chances of quality employment. Accordingly, a regulated labor market regime may 
lead to either segmented or solidaristic coordination depending on the configuration of its 
institutional components (Thelen 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 2 (configuration): The effect of increasing unemployment benefits and 
minimum income benefits on unemployment varies with the configuration of the wage 
bargaining process. Benefits increase unemployment in contexts of lower unionization and 
higher centralization and vice versa. Benefits reduce unemployment in contexts of high 
unionization and high centralization and contexts of low unionization and low 
centralization. 
 
ANALYTIC APPROACH 
 
The analysis aims to estimate how the relationship between benefits and unemployment 
varies by the level of the institutional insider/outsider divide. To this end, I combine the 
time series of country-level institutional indicators with data on individual unemployment 
from 20 European countries and the United States from 1992 to 2009.5 The use of cross-
national data over a long period of time maximizes variation in institutional arrangements. 
The multilevel structure of the data overcomes limitations of prior studies, which often 
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operated exclusively at the macro level (e.g., Layard et al. 2005; Nelson and Stephens 2012; 
Nickell 1997; OECD 2006). I transform the repeated cross-sectional data from the EULFS 
and CPS data into pseudo-panels to estimate fixed-effects models (Deaton 1985). The term 
pseudo-panels refers to a technique to transform repeated cross-sectional data on the 
individual level into synthetic panel observations on the level of social groups; this enables 
the use of panel regression techniques in the absence of real individual-level panel data. 
Because the analytic approach is intertwined with the construction of the dataset, I first 
explain pseudo-panels in more detail and how I use them in fixed-effects panel regression 
models.  
 
The pseudo-panel technique is relatively uncommon in sociological research (but see 
Barbieri and Cutuli 2016; Jæger 2013; Neugebauer 2015). Pseudo-panels allow researchers 
to estimate panel data models on the basis of repeated cross-sections. In a seminal article, 
Deaton (1985) proposed following cohorts and estimating cohort fixed effects from 
repeated cross-sectional data. The researcher can define cohorts by any number of time-
constant individual characteristics. The idea is that after grouping all individuals who share 
the same individual characteristics into cohorts, researchers can treat the group means 
within these cohorts as panel observations. When following the cohorts, scholars observe 
new samples of individuals every year. At the group level, however, individuals can be 
considered comparable over the years as long as the repeated cross-sections are 
representative. This study uses country-specific birth cohort, sex, and education groups as 
the units of analysis. The dependent variable is the mean value of unemployment within 
these groups, that is, their unemployment rate. The analysis thus operates on the meso level 
of the groups. Instead of correlating institutional indicators with country-level 
unemployment rates, I examine the relationship between benefits and the employment 
performance of sociodemographic groups, using individual-level information to model the 
group mean. 
 
The analysis uses the panel data structure in fixed-effects panel regression models (Allison 
2009). Fixed-effects models use repeated observations of the unit of analysis to decompose 
the error term of a linear regression model into a time-constant error term  	and a time-
varying error term . Formally, the models can be expressed as follows:  
 
 =  + 
 + 
 + 
 + 
 +  +  
 
where   is the unemployment rate of sociodemographic group  in year . On the right-
hand side  is the time-constant cohort-specific intercept. 
 refers to the welfare 
benefits, that is, unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits. 
 	signifies the 
institutional insider/outsider divide. 
 represents the interaction term between 
benefits and the institutional insider/outsider divide. I test the regulation hypothesis by 
using two-way interactions between the benefits and the EPL ratio, unionization, and wage 
bargaining centralization. I test the configuration hypothesis with three-way interactions, in 
which the interaction between benefits and unionization is further interacted with 
centralization. 
 denotes various time-varying control variables (see below).  and  
are the time-constant and time-varying component of the error term. 
 
The fixed-effects transformation subtracts the unit-specific mean of each variable from its 
value in each time period. The equation estimated via the fixed-effects models is the 
following: 
 
( − ) = 
( − ) + 
( − ) + 
( − ) + 
( − ̅) +  
 
The transformation eliminates the time-constant group-level difference in unemployment  
and the time-constant error term . As a result, coefficients are estimated using within-
subject variation alone, which rules out bias due to time-invariant unobservables.6 The 
cohort panels in this study are determined by the country of residence, birth year, sex, and 
education. Thus, the fixed effects account for all time-constant unobserved confounders on 
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the level of these groups. The inclusion of fixed effects on the meso level of synthetic 
cohorts is the key advantage over the more frequently applied two-way fixed-effects 
models, which use individual-level data in a cross-national setting and include fixed effects 
for countries and time (e.g., Brady et al. 2013). The pseudo-panel fixed effects account for 
more fine-grained unobserved time-constant heterogeneity than do country-level fixed 
effects. The technique thus offers an invaluable advantage in light of the number of 
potential confounders (Allison 2009). For instance, this differences out labor market 
structures, culture, work ethic, and the specific advantages of education, age, or sex groups. 
In addition, the models use panel robust standard errors, which are consistent in case of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.7 
 
In addition to enabling fixed-effects regression, a pseudo-panel approach with cross-
national comparative multilevel data provides a number of advantages over previous 
studies. First, unlike country case studies, this analysis models the macro context of benefits 
and the heterogeneous effects of benefits across different institutional settings. Second, the 
individual-level information on labor market status is cross-nationally comparable. Previous 
macro comparative studies relied on nationally reported unemployment rates. Because 
national definitions of unemployment differ, comparing reported unemployment rates is 
problematic (Howell and Rehm 2009). This is not an issue for the present study because the 
unemployment rates for the cohorts are based on micro-level information.8 Third, the 
multilevel structure of the data allows for adjustment for compositional heterogeneity. 
Previous research shows that macro-level institutions can have idiosyncratic effects on 
unemployment in different age, sex, and education groups (Bertola, Blau, and Kahn 2007). 
In contrast to macro-level studies, the meso-level data make it possible to adjust for 
compositional heterogeneity in terms of country-specific birth cohort, sex, and education 
groups.9 
 
Of course, pseudo-panels are not preferable over individual-level panel data. One central 
assumption of the present models is that the effect of benefits is not systematically biased 
within the country-specific birth cohort, sex, and education groups. However, in the absence 
of long-running cross-national panel data, constructing pseudo-panels from the repeated 
cross-sections is arguably a next-best solution. The representative nature of the cross-
sections could even lead to advantages compared to individual panel data, because these 
data are not subject to panel attrition and nonresponse as sources of bias (Deaton 1985; 
Verbeek and Vella 2005). 
 
DATA 
 
The analysis uses data on all working-age individuals (age 15 to 64) from the EULFS for 20 
European countries and the CPS for the United Sates covering 1992 to 2009. Both the 
EULFS and the CPS provide large-scaled, standardized, and representative repeated cross-
sectional information on individuals in private households with a special focus on their 
working life. Because I only use basic variables on labor market status, birth year, sex, 
education, and marital status, the two datasets are comparable (for other work combing the 
two datasets, see Hipp and Leuze 2015). The combination of the datasets offers the singular 
opportunity to analyze the labor markets of Europe and the United States over a long time 
period using annual micro-level data. The analysis starts in 1992 because the EULFS did 
not collect information on education prior to that year. Macro-level institutional indicators 
are merged with the micro data. The full set of macro-level variables is available until 2009, 
which is the upper limit for the observation period. Before transforming the data into 
pseudo-panels, the full dataset comprises almost 20 million cases, with yearly case numbers 
ranging from about 8,500 in Denmark in 2000 to about 270,000 for Italy in 2005. 
 
Panel Construction and Dependent Variable 
 
The cohort panels are based on information on country of residence, sex, birth cohort, and 
education. To construct the sociodemographic groups, the individuals are first sorted 
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according to their 21 different countries of residence. Then they are grouped according to 
their sex. The sample is split into 13 five-year birth cohorts spanning birth years from 1928 
to 1994.10 Finally, individuals are grouped according to three educational levels following 
the 1997 version of the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): low 
education includes respondents with lower secondary education or less (ISCED0-2), 
medium education contains upper- and post-secondary education (ISCED3-4), and high 
education represents persons with a tertiary education (ISCED5-6). Hence, I sort individuals 
from 21 countries, 2 sexes, 13 birth cohorts, and 3 educational levels into 1,638 units of 
observation. Because some countries entered the EULFS at a later time point or missed 
years, some birth cohorts are not part of the sample, which leaves the actual number of units 
at 1,579.11 The units of observation are followed up to 18 years, yielding a total case 
number of 18,266. 
 
The dependent variable is labor market status (1 = unemployed, 0 = employed). The surveys 
follow the definition of the ILO (1982), which considers people unemployed if they do not 
have a job, if they have actively looked for work in the past four weeks, and if they are 
currently available for work. Individuals are deemed employed if they had worked at least 
one hour during the previous week.12 Members of the country-specific sociodemographic 
groups are collapsed into one observation. Therefore, individual-level variables are 
aggregated at the group mean. Consequently, the dependent variable is the 
sociodemographic groups’ unemployment rate.13 When constructing the cohorts, yearly 
cohort-cells have to be of reasonable size so that the unemployment rate can be estimated 
robustly.14 In the present dataset, the cohort-cells have 16,500 members on average, which 
should provide for reliable measurement. However, cohort-cell case numbers vary widely. 
To tackle possible measurement error in the dependent variable, the models weight the 
cohort-cells by the square root of the number of observations (Neugebauer 2015). This 
gives more weight to observations whose measurement of the unemployment rate is more 
robust.15 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
The main explanatory variables are country-level institutions. I use net replacement rates to 
indicate the generosity of unemployment benefits. Net replacement rates are the percentage 
of one’s former income received by an average production worker from unemployment 
insurance net of taxes and social security contributions. Van Vliet and Caminada (2012) 
provide net replacement rates for singles and one-earner families with two children that 
focus on the replacement rate in the initial phase of unemployment. To take into account 
different family situations, I use the average of the two indicators.16  
 
Nelson (2010) collects information on the absolute amounts of minimum income benefits. 
The main component of the indicator is social assistance. Housing supplements, child 
support, and other benefits are added as long as they are not deducted from social 
assistance. I use the average absolute payments from several household constellations to 
construct a ratio that divides payments by the average wage. The indicator thus captures the 
economic support that minimum income benefit schemes provide as a percentage of the 
average wage. Minimum income benefits do not just serve as an alternative measure of 
unemployment benefits. The correlation of the two benefit schemes was rather low (.31 in 
the dataset used here). 
 
I use three indicators to measure the institutional insider/outsider divide on the labor 
market. The OECD provides time series for the employment protection of individuals on 
permanent and temporary contracts, which quantifies the costs and procedures involved 
with dismissal (range 0 to 6) (Venn 2009). To capture the disparity in protection for 
workers in different contract types, I calculate the EPL ratio between the two indicators.17 
Unionization, also provided by the OECD, captures the organizational power of unions as 
the percentage of salary- and wage-earners who are union members. To measure the 
centralization of the wage bargaining process, I use an indicator developed by Iversen 
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(1999) and extended by Visser (2013). The indicator measures the degree of coordination 
and centralization by combining the level of bargaining and union concentration at the 
respective levels (range 0 to 1).18 
 
Controls 
 
Following previous studies, the analysis includes a set of macro-level controls that might 
vary with time and were thus not accounted for by the fixed effects (see Layard et al. 2005; 
Nelson and Stephens 2012; Nickell 1997; OECD 2006). An important dimension of the 
wage bargaining process is how many workers are actually covered by its outcome. I use 
Visser’s (2013) adjusted coverage indicator to model the percentage of workers who are 
covered by wage bargaining agreements.19, 20, 21 Welfare states try to “activate” unemployed 
citizens via active labor market policies (ALMP), such as labor market retraining, job-
search assistance, direct job creation, and employment subsidies (Bonoli 2010). The extent 
to which a country invests in ALMP is measured as public expenditures relative to the GDP. 
To consider business cycles, this indicator is divided by the unemployment rate. Labor 
taxes affect labor demand and supply because they increase labor costs for employers yet 
also lower employees’ net earnings (Nickell 1997). The OECD calculates the labor tax 
wedge for a single-earner couple with two children and an average income. The tax wedge 
is the sum of personal income tax and social security contributions as a percentage of total 
income. Childcare policies affect the job opportunities of parents who want to work 
(Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997). A country’s dedication to publicly provided childcare is 
measured via the total public expenditure on childcare as a percentage of the GDP. Finally, 
I use the OECD’s output gap as an indicator of national business cycles (Bassanini and 
Duval 2009). The output gap measures the distance between the trend-based prediction of a 
country’s GDP and actual outcome. Table A1 in the online supplement summarizes the 
macro-level indicators by country. Because the multivariate analysis is based on within-
country variation, the table provides the average value of the respective indicator by country 
(x̄), the within-country standard deviations (w-sd), and the number of years in which the 
indicator changed compared to the previous year (N ∆). Because the multivariate analysis 
used standardized indicators to facilitate the comparison of effect sizes, the table also shows 
the overall within standard deviation to provide substantive meaning for the interpretation 
of the coefficients.  
 
In addition to the institutional and macro-economic indicators, all models include dummies 
for the survey waves to account for economic shocks and trends that affect all countries. 
This makes it possible to assess the impact of institutional changes against a common trend. 
Finally, the household context is strongly associated with individual unemployment 
(DiPrete and McManus 2000). In the absence of an ideal measure for the typical household 
composition in the sociodemographic groups, the models include marital status, 
operationalized as the average rate of married individuals within the respective groups. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptives 
 
Figures 1 and 2 plot the change in unemployment rates (provided by the OECD) against the 
change in the level of unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits between 1992 
and 2009.22 Panel A in the two figures shows the overall bivariate association between 
changes in benefits and unemployment in the 21 countries. To see whether there is 
descriptive evidence for a moderating impact of the institutional insider/outsider divide, 
Panel B groups countries into Continental/Mediterranean, Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, and 
Eastern European clusters. The existing literature sees a large insider/outsider divide in 
Continental/Mediterranean countries and a smaller divide in Nordic and Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Häusermann and Schwander 2012; Thelen 2014). Eastern European countries 
have so far not been included in such typologies. 
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Figure 1 shows that, comparing 1992 and 2009, there is a negative bivariate association 
between changes in unemployment benefits and changes in the unemployment rate (Panel 
A). Some countries, such as Italy, Finland, Denmark, and Ireland, managed to lower 
unemployment by almost 4 percentage points. On the other hand, unemployment in 
Sweden, Portugal, and the Czech Republic increased by more than 2 percentage points in 
the same period.23 Changes in the level of unemployment benefits range from reductions of 
around 20 percentage points in Sweden and Hungary to increases of 20 percentage points in 
Estonia and almost 40 percentage points in Italy. By clustering the countries, I can draw 
fitted lines that indicate potential institutional interactions (Panel B). The bivariate 
association between unemployment benefits and unemployment is negative in all four 
clusters. However, the association is strongest in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and 
rather weak in Eastern European countries. The Continental and Mediterranean countries lie 
between these clusters. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Similarly, Figure 2 displays a negative association between changes in minimum income 
benefits and changes in unemployment (Panel A). The changes in minimum income 
benefits that apply here range from a reduction of around 20 percentage points in Sweden, 
the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to increases of about 10 percentage points in Italy, 
Portugal, and Ireland.24 A strong negative association between changes in minimum income 
benefits and unemployment again emerges in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries (Panel 
B) when I cluster the countries and apply fitted lines. The bivariate association is still 
negative in the Continental and Mediterranean country cluster and the Eastern European 
country cluster, but it is weaker in both cases. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
Overall, Figures 1 and 2 lend support to the job-search-subsidy perspective. The analysis 
also provides some initial indications that the relationship between welfare benefits and 
unemployment differs between regime contexts. However, it also reveals that a simple 
grouping of countries according to typical regime clusters is not sufficient (see also 
Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015). There is strong within-cluster variation, which indicates 
that we need to go beyond the level of regimes. Another reason for going beyond regime 
clusters is that the static regime typologies they are based on disregard institutional change. 
Thelen (2014), for instance, points to diverging paths regarding dualization in two Nordic 
countries, Sweden and Denmark, and two Continental European countries, Germany and 
the Netherlands. The following fixed-effects analyses model distinct institutional 
interactions that account for changing contexts. 
 
Fixed-Effects Analyses 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of five fixed-effects regression models of unemployment on 
welfare benefits, institutions determining the insider/outsider divide, and control variables. 
Model 1 includes all the main effects, and Model 2 introduces the two-way interactions 
between unemployment benefits and the EPL ratio, unionization, and centralization. Model 
3 adds the three-way interaction between unemployment benefits, unionization, and 
centralization. Model 4 mirrors Model 2 and interacts minimum income benefits with the 
EPL ratio, unionization, and centralization. Finally, Model 5 adds the three-way interaction 
between minimum income benefits, unionization, and centralization. Hence, Models 2 and 4 
test the regulation hypothesis, and Models 3 and 5 test the configuration hypothesis. I use 
standardized coefficients, so the main effects show the association at the mean of the 
variable and their respective interaction variables. Furthermore, in the models with three-
way interactions, the two-way interactions express the association at the mean of the 
components of the three-way interaction. The coefficients can be interpreted as the change 
in unemployment rates associated with a one standard deviation change in the respective 
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variable. The multitude of interaction effects makes it more difficult to interpret the models; 
hence, I will display the main findings in graphical form. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
The baseline model (Model 1) shows a statistically significant negative association between 
unemployment benefits and the unemployment rates of sociodemographic groups (–1.1 
percentage points per standard deviation). This implies that job-search-subsidy effects 
might be stronger than disincentives. However, there is no significant association between 
minimum income benefits and unemployment. 
 
Looking at institutions that determine the insider/outsider divide, the EPL ratio shows a 
small but significant negative association with unemployment (.3 percentage points per 
standard deviation). The comparatively strong associations between unemployment and 
unionization and centralization point in opposite directions (around 3 percentage points per 
standard deviation). The negative coefficient for unionization is not what would be 
predicted by the orthodox view of labor market rigidities and their impact on 
unemployment. However, given the very mixed evidence of this literature, it is not entirely 
unprecedented (e.g., Belot and van Ours 2004).25 Moreover, as the following models will 
show, it is questionable whether modeling the impact of single institutions can clarify how 
the institutional context might influence unemployment. The coefficients of the control 
variables are mostly in line with theoretical expectations. Expenditure on ALMP is 
associated with lower unemployment and so is higher spending on childcare. Neither labor 
taxes nor bargaining coverage have significant coefficients. The significant negative 
coefficient of the output gap indicates that positive economic development is associated 
with lower unemployment. Finally, there is a strong association between marital status and 
unemployment: the higher the rate of married individuals within a sociodemographic group, 
the lower its unemployment rate. Throughout the different specifications, some of the 
control variables’ coefficients change. Because these changes do not strongly relate to the 
study’s central concerns, I will focus strictly on the main variables of interest and their 
interactions. 
 
As noted earlier, I compute models that introduce interaction terms to test the hypotheses 
about the moderating effect of the institutional insider/outsider divide. Models 2 and 3 focus 
on unemployment benefits. Model 2 includes the two-way interactions of unemployment 
benefits with the EPL ratio, unionization, and wage bargaining centralization. The 
significant coefficients for the interaction with the EPL ratio and unionization support the 
regulation hypothesis; they indicate that the association between unemployment benefits 
and unemployment becomes more positive as the disparity in the EPL ratio and 
unionization increases. In Model 3, the two-way interaction between unemployment 
benefits and centralization is also significant and positive. However, the three-way 
interaction of unemployment benefits, unionization, and centralization is significant and 
negative. In sum with the two-way interactions and the main effects, this indicates that the 
association between unemployment benefits and unemployment does not rise with 
unionization when centralization is high. Thus, while Model 2 lends support to the 
regulation hypothesis, Model 3 indicates that the configuration hypothesis is more precise 
by showing that the moderating effect of the wage bargaining process depends on its 
specific constellation. 
 
To illustrate these results, Figure 3 displays the marginal effects of unemployment benefits 
on unemployment rates across the levels of the EPL ratio, unionization, and wage 
bargaining centralization based on Model 3. The x-axis is restricted to the empirical values 
of the three institutional arrangements. Figure 3 shows that increasing unemployment 
benefits by one standard deviation is associated with a reduction in unemployment of 
almost 3 percentage points in a context of very low EPL (Panel A). This association comes 
closer to 0 as the EPL ratio rises. It only becomes significantly positive when the EPL ratio 
is extremely high; at such levels, a one standard deviation increase in unemployment 
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benefits is associated with about a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment. Panel B 
shows that unionization and centralization are complementary moderators. When 
centralization is low (defined as one standard deviation below the mean), lower 
unionization leads to a more negative association between unemployment benefits and 
unemployment (up to around –5 percentage points per standard deviation). In the same 
context, higher unionization leads to a more positive association between unemployment 
benefits and unemployment (up to about 6 percentage points per standard deviation). Yet 
when centralization is high (defined as one standard deviation above the mean), 
unionization does not moderate the association between unemployment benefits and 
unemployment rates. In such cases, the coefficient never significantly differs from 0, 
indicating no association between unemployment benefits and unemployment. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Models 4 and 5 focus on minimum income benefits. Model 4 shows significant positive 
coefficients for the interactions between minimum income benefits and the EPL ratio, 
unionization, and wage bargaining centralization. This supports the regulation hypothesis. 
Yet again, the significant negative coefficient for the three-way interaction between 
minimum income benefits, unionization, and centralization added in Model 5 confirms that 
the configuration hypothesis is more precise. 
 
Figure 4 displays the marginal effects of minimum income benefits across levels of EPL 
ratio, unionization, and centralization based on Model 5. The pattern here is similar to the 
pattern for unemployment benefits. As the EPL ratio increases, the association between 
minimum income benefits and unemployment goes from being negative to positive. 
Whereas minimum income benefits show a negative association with unemployment at 
extremely low levels of the EPL ratio, of up to about –1.5 percentage points per standard 
deviation, the association is positive at extremely high levels of the EPL ratio, at around 1.5 
percentage points. Again, Panel B shows that the moderating influence of unionization and 
centralization depends on the respective level of the other institution. The association 
between minimum income benefits and unemployment becomes more positive for 
increasing levels of unionization in a context of low wage bargaining centralization. Here, a 
low level of unionization leads to a negative association of up to –6 percentage points, 
whereas a high level of unionization can lead to an association of up to around 7 percentage 
points. By contrast, in a context of high centralization, the association is initially positive (at 
about 4 percentage points per standard deviation) but gets slightly smaller and ultimately 
becomes insignificant as unionization rises. The findings for minimum income benefits 
differ from those for unemployment benefits; there is a positive association between 
minimum income benefits and unemployment for all but the very highest levels of 
unionization when centralization is high. The results still support the configuration 
hypothesis, because minimum income benefits are associated with lower unemployment 
when both unionization and centralization are high compared to when just one of these 
factors is high. But in absolute terms, minimum income benefits are still positively 
associated with unemployment except in extremely unionized cases. 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
In summary, the findings support the proposition that the effect of welfare benefits on 
employment is moderated by the institutional insider/outsider divide. Specifically, Models 2 
and 4 show that the association between welfare benefits and unemployment gets worse as 
regulation increases, which seemingly confirms the regulation hypothesis. Yet in 
accordance with the configuration hypothesis, Models 3 and 5 qualify these findings. The 
insider/outsider divide does not simply increase with higher levels of regulation. Instead, 
the specific constellation of institutions determines the institutional insider/outsider divide 
and thus moderates the association between benefits and unemployment. 
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Stylized Regimes, Country Case Examples, and Long-Term Associations 
 
To make these results more concrete, I calculate predictive figures of the association 
between the respective benefit and unemployment for four stylized regime types based on 
Models 3 and 5 (Table 1). The stylized regimes are based on configurations of the three 
institutions that determine the insider/outsider divide: the EPL ratio, unionization, and 
centralization. A “low” value is one standard deviation below the mean. A “high” value is 
one standard deviation above the mean. These figures further illustrate the main findings 
and also explore the association between a change in welfare benefits and the development 
of unemployment in the long-term. They allow me to investigate the timing implications of 
the disincentive perspective and the job-search-subsidy perspective. This is relevant because 
disincentives to work should arise immediately after benefit levels increase. By contrast, 
job-search-subsidy effects are long-term in character; they are based on the assumption that 
better job matches and the improved employability of jobseekers will ultimately lead to 
lower unemployment (Morel et al. 2012; Pollmann-Schult and Büchel 2005). Figures 5 and 
6 depict results for the stylized regimes and lagged models of benefit changes (modeled 
using lagged benefit indicators from 0 to 5 year lags; full models can be found in Tables A2 
and A3 in the online supplement). At t = 0, the figures illustrate Models 3 and 5 in Table 1 
for the stylized regimes. At t = 1 to 5, the figures show the association between a change in 
benefits and a change in unemployment one to five years onward.26 
 
Figure 5 shows unemployment benefits have by far the most negative association with 
unemployment when there is a low level of all three institutions that determine the 
insider/outsider divide. However, as the findings for the other regime types show, it is the 
way the regulating institutions are configured that determines whether the association 
becomes positive. In a regime with a low EPL ratio, in which the wage bargaining process 
combines high unionization with high centralization, the association is still negative. By 
contrast, there is a positive association between unemployment benefits and unemployment 
in the two regimes that combine a high EPL ratio with either low unionization and high 
centralization or high unionization and low centralization. 
 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 
 
Figure 6 shows the associations between minimum income benefits and unemployment for 
the four stylized regimes. The main difference between the findings on minimum income 
benefit and those on unemployment benefit is that raising minimum income benefits is 
associated with higher unemployment in three of the four stylized regimes instead of two. In 
a regime with a low EPL ratio, high unionization, and high centralization, there is a lower 
positive association between minimum income benefits and unemployment than is found in 
regimes with either high unionization and low centralization or low unionization and high 
centralization. Yet, as discussed when presenting Figure 4, the association does not become 
negative.27 
 
<Insert Figure 6 about here> 
 
In the stylized regimes, the association between benefits and unemployment differs strongly 
according to the configuration of labor market institutions and the extent to which they 
divide insiders and outsiders. Can we observe these patterns in real-typical country cases? 
 
The most prominent country with a low level of unionization and an above-average level of 
centralization is Germany. After experiencing historically high levels of unemployment up 
to 2005, Germany saw its unemployment drop in the later 2000s. Looking at benefits, at 
first glance neither unemployment benefits nor minimum income benefits changed much in 
this period. However, reforms between 2003 and 2005 shifted large sections of the 
unemployed from more generous unemployment benefits to comparatively lower minimum 
income benefits. The reforms also linked benefits more closely to active job-search efforts, 
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which were increasingly strictly monitored. At the same time, the reforms made it easier for 
employers to create atypical jobs; for instance, newly established firms could use fixed-term 
contracts for up to four years without having to provide a valid reason, and employers could 
now create “mini-jobs,” that is, jobs with low hours, low wages, and no benefits. This 
period saw a steep increase in the EPL ratio. The subsequent decrease in unemployment is 
often described as a result of expansion in atypical employment. This development is in line 
with this study’s findings: in the comparatively dualized German labor market, benefit 
retrenchment was associated with lower unemployment as individuals were forced to take 
jobs they would perhaps have declined in another context. 
 
Some countries, such as Ireland and Austria, became more similar to Germany in their 
institutional configuration in the later 2000s (mostly due to declining unionization), whereas 
others, like Slovakia, had combined an above-average EPL ratio, lower unionization, and 
relatively high centralization for a longer time. In line with the models, unemployment rose 
steeply in Slovakia until 2005 and then decreased again when minimum income benefits 
were reduced. 
 
The combination of above-average unionization and low centralization is rare. The United 
Kingdom fit this constellation in the early 1990s, as did Italy and Slovenia in some years. 
Finland is the only country that was consistently in this category. As the models suggest, a 
steady retrenchment of unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s accompanied a consistent decline in unemployment in Finland. 
 
The Nordic countries—Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—are well known for their 
combination of high unionization and centralization. This configuration was also present in 
Belgium, Austria, and Ireland until these countries became more similar to Germany in the 
later 2000s. All Nordic countries have cut back their very generous welfare states to some 
degree since the 1990s. Among them, Sweden is an interesting case because it not only cut 
benefits more substantially than did Denmark or Norway, but it also developed a more 
dualized labor market. Unionization has declined from above 85 percent in the 1990s to 
below 70 percent in the later 2000s. Most dramatically, as part of a reform package in 2006 
that significantly lowered unemployment benefits from 72.5 percent to 62 percent of former 
wages, wage bargaining was strongly decentralized and the use of fixed-term contracts was 
made easier (resulting in a higher EPL ratio). After a severe economic crisis, Swedish 
unemployment levels consistently decreased until the early 2000s, when they substantially 
rose again, which prompted the reforms. The changes were indeed accompanied by a 
subsequent decrease in unemployment, possibly because lowering benefits works well in an 
increasingly dualized labor market with more atypical jobs. However, the results of this 
study suggest that Sweden has turned its back on a model that could have been equally 
successful in lowering unemployment but without increasing labor market inequality. 
 
Finally, the United States is the most obvious country fitting the configuration, with low 
levels of all three institutions that determine the insider/outsider divide. Hence, we would 
expect increasing benefits to be associated with lower unemployment. Unemployment 
benefits only changed from 58.5 to 54.5 percent in the observation period, but minimum 
income benefits dropped from around 22 percent to about 15 percent of average wages. U.S. 
unemployment rates dropped throughout the 1990s, then briefly spiked in the early 2000s 
before quickly decreasing; they only rose again during the economic crisis. The model 
predictions are thus not completely borne out in the United States. This is probably because 
the models do not aim to fully predict unemployment but to estimate the association 
between benefits and unemployment while adjusting for potential confounding factors. 
Because some important factors that influence trends in unemployment are not included in 
the models, and because the ceteris paribus conditions of the multivariate analysis are not 
met, it is possible for unemployment to increase although the specifications of the models 
would predict a decline. However, the implication is that increasing benefits would not have 
harmed the development of unemployment in the United States. According to the models, 
the quick recovery in U.S. unemployment after the crisis was aided rather than hindered by 
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the temporary increase in the generosity of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
measure. The pattern observed in Switzerland, a country that also has low levels of 
regulation in respect to the three institutions, fits the predictions better. Unemployment 
benefits did not change substantially, but there was a steady decrease in minimum income 
benefits in relation to average wages. At the same time, unemployment increased from very 
low levels of between 2 and 4 percent in the 1990s to up to 6 percent in the 2000s. 
 
As a last step, examining the lagged effects in Figure 5, it becomes evident that the 
association between a change in unemployment benefits and unemployment tends toward 
zero in all regime types. In some cases they are not significantly different from zero after 
some years. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the coefficients for minimum income benefits 
decrease over time. Yet, they remain significantly different from zero except for the regime 
type with a high EPL ratio, high unionization, and low centralization. Because the 
associations tend to be strongest immediately after a change in benefits, and because there 
are both negative and positive associations, the findings for the lagged models do not 
strongly support either the disincentive perspective or the job-search-subsidy perspective. In 
regime types with a high EPL ratio and either low unionization and high centralization or 
high unionization and low centralization, the positive association diminishes over time, 
which we could interpret as an initial disincentive effect that is outweighed by job-search-
subsidy effects in the long run. This seems a stretch, however, as the associations come 
closer to zero in all four regime types. Instead, the change over time might be due to 
institutional changes that the models cannot take into account. For instance, there may be 
additional benefits reform after some years, thus biasing the results for all subsequent years. 
Moreover, the time restrictions of the dataset cause the case numbers to go down with each 
added lag. 
 
Weighing the evidence, the findings indicate that the institutional context influences 
whether disincentive effects outweigh job-search-subsidy effects or vice versa. The 
empirical evidence suggests that for job-search subsidies to come into effect, the labor 
market needs to offer jobseekers attractive opportunities. When a large institutional 
insider/outsider divide reduces quality job opportunities, generous benefits are a 
disincentive to job search. There is no evidence that the strong job protection and high 
wages enjoyed by insiders serve as an added incentive to look for these positions in 
countries with a strong insider/outsider divide, so that increased job-search efforts might 
ultimately make up for the lower job opportunities. In fact, only meager benefits force 
jobseekers to take job offers they would otherwise decline. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study investigated the effect of welfare benefits on unemployment. The dominant 
disincentive perspective contends that generous benefits act as a disincentive to work and 
increase unemployment. By contrast, proponents of the job-search-subsidy perspective 
argue that generous benefits lead to better job matches and lower unemployment levels. 
This article showed that the relationship depends on the institutional context. I demonstrate 
that the disparity between EPL for permanent and temporary contract holders, and the 
configuration of the wage bargaining process in terms of unionization and centralization, 
determine the institutional insider/outsider divide and thereby moderate how unemployment 
benefits and minimum income benefits affect unemployment. To test this proposition, the 
analysis combined data from 20 European countries in the EULFS and from the United 
States CPS from 1992 to 2009. I transformed the repeated cross-sectional data into pseudo-
panels to use fixed effects at the level of sociodemographic groups. The empirical findings 
corroborate the main proposition of the article: the job-search-subsidy function of generous 
benefits can indeed outweigh potential disincentives to work, lowering unemployment at 
the aggregate level. However, for job-search subsidies to come into effect, the labor market 
needs to offer jobseekers attractive opportunities. The labor market’s capacity to provide 
this type of labor demand depends on the positional advantages labor market insiders 
receive from the institutional context. When a large institutional insider/outsider divide 
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diminishes quality job opportunities, the disincentive effects of generous benefits seem to 
prevail. Within such institutional contexts, meager benefits force jobseekers into 
employment, possibly accepting job offers they would otherwise decline.  
 
The study makes three distinct contributions to the literature. First, it establishes the 
institutional insider/outsider divide as a moderator of the relationship between benefits and 
unemployment. In a broader perspective, this supports scholarship that points out the 
existence of institutional interdependencies in national economies (e.g., Amable 2003; Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005). Second, by testing the hypothesis with indicators for 
unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits, the analysis extends beyond prior 
work’s focus on unemployment insurance. I find very similar patterns for the relationship 
between both benefits and unemployment, which suggests their impact on job-search 
processes follows similar mechanisms. Third, by using pseudo-panels, the study illustrates a 
rarely used modeling technique. Comparative micro-level datasets are rarely in panel form, 
so applying this method in future studies and revisiting existing evidence might prove 
useful for comparative research. 
 
Two important matters could not be tackled within the scope of this study. First, the 
analysis relied on a binary distinction between employment and unemployment. 
Distinguishing between different types of jobs might provide further insights on the effect 
of benefits on labor markets (Kalleberg 2011). Previous studies indicate that in labor 
markets with a large insider/outsider divide, jobseekers are not only more likely to remain 
out of employment, they are also more likely to enter atypical jobs (Biegert 2014; Fervers 
and Schwander 2015; Schwander and Häusermann 2013). On the other hand, in several 
countries, workers in low-wage jobs can receive welfare benefits. Hence, in certain 
contexts, benefits could subsidize low-wage jobs rather than providing job-search 
subsidies.28 Future studies that explore how benefits and labor market institutions relate to 
the quality of jobs could complement the present analysis. Second, although the findings 
suggest that unemployment benefits and minimum income benefits work via similar 
mechanisms, the emerging differences between the two warrant further study. This is 
especially relevant because the dualization literature argues that exclusive benefits, such as 
unemployment insurance, can themselves be an integral part of an insider/outsider labor 
market (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Palier and Thelen 2010). 
 
The present study adds a crucial dimension to the existing research on the relationship 
between the welfare state and unemployment. It establishes that lower levels of the 
institutional insider/outsider divide make it possible for generous welfare benefits to have a 
positive impact on unemployment. The results suggest that individuals are willing to work 
despite monetary incentives as long as there are attractive job opportunities. The findings 
have two important policy implications. First, they tie in with the claims of the flexicurity 
literature (see Kalleberg 2011; Viebrock and Clasen 2008; Wilthagen and Tros 2004). This 
literature highlights the beneficial interaction between a generous welfare state and a 
flexible labor market. Proponents argue that such institutional constellations enable high 
levels of employment security, especially when combined with ALMP. Similarly, Thelen 
(2014) describes an “embedded flexibilization,” in which generous benefits are necessary to 
create employment security and to collectivize the social risk of job loss in a liberalized 
labor market. The results of this study suggest that implementing such strategies could help 
achieve low unemployment while also providing high levels of social security in times of 
joblessness.  
 
Second, neither retrenching benefits nor deregulating labor markets are necessarily 
successful strategies to tackle unemployment. Instead, the study raises an additional 
question, namely how to break down barriers between insiders and outsiders while retaining 
the benefits of institutions that improve the positions of insiders. For instance, we know that 
strong unions are crucial for better working conditions and low wage inequality (Brady et 
al. 2013; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Western and Rosenfeld 2011). The results imply that 
the insider/outsider divide does not simply move along a spectrum between flexibility and 
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regulation, but in some configurations coordination does not inhibit the positive effects of 
benefits for employment. The findings point to constellations that combine high levels of 
economic security with better working conditions and high and equal wages, without 
excluding sections of the population from gainful employment.  
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Notes 
1. In many countries, benefit levels are reduced after a certain amount of time. The job-
search-subsidy argument focuses on initial levels of benefits for jobseekers, highlighting 
their effect on the job-search period immediately after job loss (e.g., Nelson and Stephens 
2012). Long-term unemployed individuals might be discouraged or not employable. 
Because this affects the intensity of their job search, job-search-subsidy effects are less 
likely. 
 
2. There are different definitions of insiders and outsiders in the literature. Early iterations 
of insider/outsider theory used a snapshot perspective on the labor force to define who is an 
insider and who is an outsider. The employed are considered insiders and the unemployed 
are considered outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). Most of the dualization literature has 
modified this definition by including temporary workers in the group of outsiders (e.g., 
Rueda 2005). Thus, employed individuals can also be outsiders, but they have a higher 
propensity of future unemployment. Some contributions to the dualization literature use a 
life-course perspective (e.g., Schwander and Häusermann 2013). Outsiders are understood 
as individuals who are more likely to experience unemployment and precarious work 
situations over their careers. According to this definition, unemployed individuals could be 
insiders if they only experience a short spell of unemployment between permanent jobs. 
The life-course definition is helpful, for instance, when investigating the policy preferences 
of insiders and outsiders. Here, I am interested in how benefits affect the unemployed, that 
is, individuals who are outsiders at this very moment, which is why the snapshot definition 
is more appropriate. More importantly, differences between the snapshot definition and the 
life-course definition do not directly affect the core of the proposed theoretical argument, 
because it is not about complete congruence between the unemployed and outsiders but 
about how benefits affect jobseekers’ search process and how the insider/outsider divide 
affects the availability of attractive jobs for jobseekers. 
 
3. Iversen (1998) convincingly argues that the relationship between unions, the wage 
bargaining system, and economic outcomes such as unemployment depends on the given 
monetary policy regime. To test whether monetary policy affects the relationships proposed 
here, I ran a robustness check adjusting for central bank independence (see Table B7 and 
Figure B2 [“Incl. Central Bank Indep.”] in the online supplement). Inclusion of this 
indicator does not yield substantively different results. 
 
4. Depending on the macro-economic context, beneficial outcomes for insiders could 
include alternatives to wage increases such as higher job security. Either way, these 
bargaining outcomes will decrease quality job opportunities for jobseekers. 
 
5. The code for the dataset and analyses is available on the author’s webpage. 
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6. As a robustness check, I conducted the analysis using random-effects models, which use 
between variation as well. The results do not substantively differ (see Table B12 and Figure 
B3 [“Random Effects Models”] in the online supplement). 
 
7. Clustering standard errors at the country or country-year level, the main findings remain 
unchanged, albeit modestly less significant. In another robustness check (available from the 
author), I ran the models using a multilevel specification that also confirmed the findings 
(for a similar approach, see Jæger 2013). 
 
8. Rather than modeling national unemployment more accurately, group-level 
unemployment rates approximate individual-level unemployment. In the absence of real 
individual panel data, this is a preferable way of modeling the proposed macro-micro 
mechanisms. When I aggregate the unemployment rates of the various sociodemographic 
groups at the country-year level, they are still highly correlated (.89) with the official 
numbers from the OECD, which confirms the validity of the data used here. 
 
9. I also use the data structure to run a robustness check on the subsample of low-educated 
individuals to see whether disincentive effects are stronger among individuals with lower 
wage expectations (see Table B8 and Figure B2 [“Low-Educated Sample”] in the online 
supplement). 
 
10. Because of the restriction to working-age (15 to 64) individuals, 1928 is the first year an 
individual could be born and still enter the sample in 1992. 1994 is the last year an 
individual could be born and enter the sample before the end of 2009. 
 
11. I selected the countries according to the availability of micro data and macro indicators. 
These are the countries in alphabetical order: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Data collection for France starts in 1993; for Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995; 
for the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland in 1996; for Hungary in 1997; for Slovakia in 
1998; for Estonia in 2003; and for Slovenia in 2004. Data from 1998 are dropped for Ireland 
and the United Kingdom due to missing information on education. 
 
12. I ran robustness checks in which I coded only respondents who worked at least 35 hours 
a week or more as being employed. This alternative model reveals some differences from 
the main analysis, which I discuss in the online supplement (see also Table B9 and Figure 
B2 [“<35 Hours + Unemployed”]). 
 
13. The definition of the dependent variable excludes jobless individuals who are not 
actively seeking a job, that is, the inactive. Robustness checks using the nonemployment 
rate and the inactivity rate as dependent variables yield results that, in line with the 
theoretical expectations, imply that inactive individuals are less affected by benefits and 
labor market institutions than are the unemployed (see Tables B10 and B11, Figure B3 
[“Inactive” and “Nonemployed”], and the discussion in the online supplement). 
 
14. To increase case numbers, we could think of any number of further time-constant 
determinants of cohort membership or use a more fine-grained grouping of birth cohorts. 
Some possibilities, such as race or place of birth, are not available for the full sample. More 
importantly, this would reduce robustness in the measurement of aggregated time-varying 
cohort-level variables, such as the unemployment rate. 
 
15. Because some countries consistently have larger case numbers than others, this 
procedure might increase their weight in the analysis and thus bias the results. I ran the 
models without the weights and did not find meaningful differences (see Table B13 and 
Figure B3 [“Without Weights”] in the online supplement). 
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16. Other components of unemployment benefits might affect their overall generosity, such 
as benefit duration, eligibility criteria, and coverage. I ran robustness checks with an 
indicator that comprehensively included these components but was not available for the full 
set of countries (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2014). I found some differences, which I discuss 
in the online supplement (see Table B1 and Figure B1 [“Unemp. Benefit Generosity”]). 
 
17. I ran robustness checks using the indicator for EPL for permanent contracts instead of 
the ratio and controlling for EPL for temporary contracts. The differences in the results 
indicate that the disparity in EPL for permanent contracts and temporary contracts is more 
important for the insider/outsider divide and the effect of benefits on unemployment than 
the overall level of EPL (see Table B6 and Figure B2 [“EPL Permanent Contracts”] in the 
online supplement). 
 
18. Centralization is a concept closely related to corporatism (although the two are not 
interchangeable, see Calmfors and Driffill 1988). I ran robustness checks using an indicator 
for corporatism instead of centralization (Jahn 2014). I found only minor differences, which 
I discuss in the online supplement (see Table B5 and Figure B1 [“Corporatism”]). 
 
19. There are gaps in the time series for coverage. In order not to lose observations, I 
interpolate values linearly. 
 
20. Coverage might moderate unionization effects in a similar way to centralization. 
Furthermore, some countries known for their strong insider/outsider divides, such as 
France, Portugal, and Spain, show high coverage although centralization is rather low. I ran 
robustness checks including interactions with coverage instead of centralization and found 
slight differences, which I discuss in the online supplement (see Table B4 and Figure B1 
[“Coverage”]).  
 
21. Another potentially relevant confounder is the organization of unemployment benefits 
in a Ghent system, where unions administer the benefits. I ran a robustness check excluding 
the four Ghent countries (Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Sweden); it did not yield 
substantively different results (see Table B3 and Figure B1 [“Without Ghent Countries”] in 
the online supplement). 
 
22. The figures use the overall difference in the indicators between two time points: 1992 
and 2009. Thus, the figures do not show the substantial variance in the years between these 
two time points within countries (see Table A1 in the online supplement). 
 
23. In 2009, the unemployment rate in many countries was already affected by the global 
economic crisis. Using other time frames produces different change rates. However, the 
overall pattern for the bivariate relationships between benefits and unemployment rates is 
robust. 
 
24. Judging from the figures, there might be single countries strongly driving the 
association between changes in benefits and changes in unemployment. I ran the models for 
unemployment benefits without Italy and Sweden and the models for minimum income 
benefits without the Czech Republic, Italy, and Sweden (see Table B2 and Figure B1 
[“Without Potential Outliers”] in the online supplement). Excluding these potential outliers 
did not substantively change the main findings. 
 
25. The coefficient became insignificant and dramatically diminished in size when I ran the 
models without wave dummies. This might hint at potential shortcomings in previous 
studies, as many did not adjust for global trends (Belot and van Ours [2004] being an 
exception). 
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26. The lagged independent variable models deal with two more concerns. First, politicians 
might increase welfare benefits to appease a growing population of unemployed people. 
Hence, there might be reverse causality. Second, because measurement on the micro level is 
spread over the whole year, information on individuals’ labor market status might stem 
from a time point before policy changes took place. The order of events might thus be 
corrupted in some cases. 
 
27. Additional analyses investigating potential outliers indicate that this prediction changes 
and becomes more similar to the predictions for unemployment benefits when excluding 
Sweden, Italy, and the Czech Republic (see Table B2 and Figure B1 [“Without Potential 
Outliers”] in the online supplement). 
 
28. See the discussion of robustness checks using an alternative dependent variable that 
only codes individuals with at least 35 work hours as employed (Table B9 and Figure B2 
[“<35 Hours + Unempl.”] in the online supplement). 
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Table 1. Fixed-Effects Regressions of Unemployment on Welfare Benefits and Their Interactions with the 
Institutional Insider/Outsider Divide 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 
Unemployment Benefits  –.011** 
(.004) 
–.010** 
(.003) 
–.005 
(.003) 
–.010** 
(.003) 
–.008* 
(.003) 
Unempl. Benefits × EPL ratio 
 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.009*** 
(.002)   
Unempl. Benefits × Unionization 
 
.010*** 
(.002) 
.015*** 
(.002)   
Unempl. Benefits × Centralization 
 
.002 
(.003) 
.006* 
(.003)   
Unempl. Ben. × Union. × Cent. 
  
–.021*** 
(.003)   
Minimum Income Benefits .003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.003) 
.004 
(.003) 
–.002 
(.003) 
.007 
(.004) 
Min. Inc. Ben. × EPL ratio 
   
.010*** 
(.002) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
Min. Inc. Ben. × Unionization 
   
.010*** 
(.003) 
.015*** 
(.003) 
Min. Inc. Ben. × Centralization 
   
.023*** 
(.004) 
.020*** 
(.004) 
Min. Inc. Ben. × Union. × Cent. 
    
–.023*** 
(.005) 
Union. × Centralization 
  
–.029*** 
(.004)  
–.021*** 
(.004) 
EPL ratio –.003* 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.007*** 
(.002) 
.000 
(.001) 
–.001 
(.001) 
Unionization –.032** 
(.010) 
–.032*** 
(.009) 
–.013 
(.009) 
–.050*** 
(.010) 
–.045*** 
(.011) 
Centralization .028*** 
(.005) 
.019*** 
(.005) 
.021*** 
(.005) 
.006 
(.005) 
.017*** 
(.005) 
Coverage  –.001 
(.006) 
.016** 
(.006) 
.015* 
(.006) 
.010 
(.006) 
–.002 
(.006) 
ALMP –.014*** 
(.002) 
–.016*** 
(.002) 
–.017*** 
(.002) 
–.013*** 
(.001) 
–.012*** 
(.001) 
Labor Taxes .003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.009** 
(.003) 
Childcare –.009*** 
(.002) 
–.014*** 
(.002) 
–.013*** 
(.003) 
–.012*** 
(.002) 
–.005* 
(.002) 
Output Gap –.018*** 
(.001) 
–.015*** 
(.001) 
–.014*** 
(.001) 
–.016*** 
(.001) 
–.016*** 
(.001) 
Marital Status –.040*** 
(.004) 
–.040*** 
(.003) 
–.041*** 
(.003) 
–.040*** 
(.003) 
–.041*** 
(.003) 
Wave Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
N 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579 1,579 
Observations 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266 
R2 (within) .335 .340 .348 .348 .355 
Note: Coefficients and (panel robust standard errors) from OLS fixed-effects regressions. Constants not shown.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).  
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Figure 1. Changes in Unemployment Rates and Unemployment Benefits from 1992 to 
2009 in 21 Countries 
Note: Change scores for unemployment and unemployment benefits computed as 
differences between 1992 and 2009 (due to missing data, first observation is 1994 for SK 
and CZ, 1995 for HU, 1996 for PT, 2000 for EE, and 2002 for SI).  
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Figure 2. Changes in Unemployment Rates and Minimum Income Benefits from 1992 to 
2009 in 21 Countries 
Note: Change scores for unemployment and unemployment benefits computed as 
differences between 1992 and 2009 (due to missing data, first observation is 1994 for SK 
and CZ, 1995 for HU, 1996 for PT, 2000 for EE, and 2002 for SI). 
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Unemployment Benefits on Unemployment Rates across 
Levels of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization 
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 3 (see Table 1). The range of 
computed marginal effects is determined by empirical levels of EPL, unionization, and 
centralization. 
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Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Minimum Income Benefits on Unemployment Rates across 
Levels of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization 
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 5 (see Table 1). The range of 
computed marginal effects is determined by empirical levels of EPL, unionization, and 
centralization. 
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Figure 5. Lagged Marginal Effects (up to five years) of Unemployment Benefits on 
Unemployment Rates across Configurations of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization 
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 3 (see Table 1) including lagged 
indicators of unemployment benefits up to five years (see Table A2 in the online 
supplement). Low EPL ratio, unionization, centralization = mean – standard deviation. High 
EPL ratio, unionization, centralization = mean + standard deviation. 
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Figure 6. Lagged Marginal Effects (up to five years) of Minimum Income Benefits on 
Unemployment Rates across Configurations of EPL Ratio, Unionization, and Centralization 
Note: Marginal effects computed on the basis of Model 5 (see Table 1) including lagged 
indicators of minimum income benefits up to five years (see Table A3 in the online 
supplement). Low EPL ratio, unionization, centralization = mean – standard deviation. High 
EPL ratio, unionization, centralization = mean + standard deviation. 
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